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In several papers, Hans-Werner Sinn has discussed
the change in Target2 (T2) balances in the euro area
(see, among others, Sinn 2011a; Sinn and Wollmers  -
häuser 2011). The debate he has triggered has cer-
tainly contributed to a better understanding of the
functioning of monetary policy in the euro area.
However, several of his conclusions and the policy
recommendations he has drawn have not remained
without objection. In particular the following
hypotheses, which we have extracted from Sinn’s writ-
ings, have provoked controversy. 
a) Non-necessity hypothesis
According to this hypothesis, the expansion of the
liquidity provision by central banks was unnecessary
as of a certain point in time, as it no longer consti-
tuted a proper measure to support the banking sec-
tor. Sinn argues that the central bank measures, as
far as they also targeted sovereign debtors, exacer-
bated the real problems and benefited only a few
asset owners, inter alia because they were not dis-
continued in time: “surely, there would have been
many bankruptcies, but a bankruptcy does not mean
that the assets disappear, only that they move to
other people. Beneficiaries of the ECB policy were
primarily the rich asset owners of the GIPS coun-
tries who succeeded in rescuing their assets abroad”
(Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, 41) Sinn and
Wollmershäuser acknowledge that the measures
were justified during the acute peak of the banking
crisis in 2008/2009. 
In our opinion, this argument underestimates the
role of the negative externalities of sovereign fund-
ing stress or sovereign default, and the fact that sov-
ereign stability is a precondition for financial stabili-
ty in general.1 A sovereign default, and implied cor-
porate and bank defaults are not tantamount to a
mere reallocation of assets (as suggested by the
above quote), but entail considerable economic
costs. As long as destructive funding stress and
defaults are merely due to illiquidity (rather than
insolvency), these costs can and should be prevented
by appropriate central bank interventions. An exam-
ple of the disaster that can be caused by systemic liq-
uidity crises and the ensuing collapse of banks is the
German banking crisis of 1931. 
b) Fiscal character hypothesis 
According to the fiscal character hypothesis, the T2
balances are not a proper monetary policy measure,
but rather a fiscal policy measure: “[…] the Target
credits clearly [had] no monetary character […] they
are a purely fiscal measure that would have had to be
financed out of the budgets of the euro countries by
consulting the parliaments” (Sinn and Wollmers  -
häuser 2011, 33).
Here we may point out that the development of the
T2 balances is an automatic reflex that mirrors
cross-border payment flows between banks in the
euro area (corresponding to transactions which are
initiated by private entities in most cases) and does
not represent a separate policy measure. Further  -
more, according to the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, the ECB and the European
System of Central Banks are responsible for pro-
moting the smooth operation of payment systems in
the European currency area (see Section 2.1).
Therefore, all developments regarding the T2 system
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1 These comprise, for example, job losses, increase in depreciation of
the accumulated human and social capital, costs of liquidation in
the case of a sale of assets, costs of bank customers searching for a
new institution (especially in the banking business these costs can be
considerable due to the information intensity of the contracts in
question).are the responsibility of monetary policy, and not of
fiscal policy. 
c) Credit replacement hypothesis 
The credit replacement hypothesis can be divided into
two parts. The first part basically states that the pay-
ment flows reflected in the T2 balances reduce the
recourse to central bank refinancing operations of
those banks in countries with large T2 claims, where-
as they increase banks’ recourse in countries with
large T2 liabilities. This part of the hypothesis can be
easily verified (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011).
The second part is more difficult to test because it is
purely counterfactual. It states that the reduction of
the participation in the refinancing operations leads
to a reduction in commercial banks granting credit to
private customers in the countries in question. Our
view is that this part of the hypothesis cannot be sub-
stantiated from an economic point of view (Sinn and
Wollmershäuser 2011).
In Section 2.3 we deal with the first part of the credit
crowding-out hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the sec-
ond part of the hypothesis. 
d) Recommendation to limit the T2 positions
According to this recommendation, the limitation of
the T2 positions or a regular, annual settlement by the
transfer of gold or foreign exchange would induce the
countries with T2 liabilities to reduce their current
account deficits. The ‘role model’ for Sinn and
Wollmershäuser (2011) are the supposedly stricter
rules of the settlement system between the individual
Reserve Banks of the twelve districts of the Federal
Reserve System in the United States: “in our opinion,
the Eurosystem ought to adopt the rule of the United
States, according to which the Target debts are to be
serviced annually with marketable assets” (Sinn and
Wollmershäuser 2011, 50).
In our view, a limitation of T2 positions would call
into question the monetary union. A regular settle-
ment has the same effect as a limitation and would
basically transform the monetary union into a sys-
tem of fixed exchange rates in which the solvency of
a country would be limited by its stocks of gold and
foreign exchange (on this see Bindseil and König
2011). Furthermore, in our view, the description of
the Federal Reserve System in this context is not
quite correct. The annual settlement of the
Interdistrict balances in the Federal Reserve System
does not lead to a neutralizing capital flow. The set-
tlement consists essentially of an adjustment of the
relative shares of the twelve Reserve Banks2 in the
stocks of securities booked in the System Open
Market Account of the Federal Reserve System.
This accounting operation results only in a realloca-
tion of profits and losses between the Reserve Banks.
If the Eurosystem were to adopt the rules of the
Federal Reserve System, this would indeed reduce
the T2 positions in the balance sheets of the central
banks, but only as a mere accounting operation and
without a reduction of the actual net capital flows
via the T2 system. This is clearly shown by the data
of the Interdistrict balances in the Federal Reserve
System. The balances also rose considerably during
the financial crisis, and in some cases have reached
magnitudes similar to the T2 balances despite the
annual offset.3
e) Risk hypothesis
This hypothesis implies that the T2 positions repre-
sent a source of risk independent from the risks borne
by the central bank when it conducts refinancing
operations. According to Sinn (2011b), risks related to
Target2 liabilities to the GIPS countries do not
account for the source of risk related to “the central
bank credits in the context of the normal refinancing
operations” (translated from “Dabei sind die Kredite
der Zentralbank im Rahmen der normalen Geld  -
schöp  fungspolitik noch nicht eingerechnet”.) The risk
hypothesis regarding Target2 balances was convinc-
ingly refuted by the Bundesbank. We shall discuss this
hypothesis in Section 4 and deal more extensively with
the trade-off for a central bank between providing liq-
uidity and taking more risk on its balance-sheet dur-
ing a crisis.
f) ‘Five-minutes to midnight’ hypothesis
According to this view (exposed in Sinn and Woll  -
mershäuser 2011, 37–40), the ECB would run out of
ammunition at some stage in its rescue measures,
because the transfer of Eurosystem credit operations
from the core to the periphery would at some stage hit
a ceiling, namely when Eurosystem credit to Germany
would be zero. At this time, some fundamental further
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2 The payment flows between the various Federal Reserve districts
result naturally in individual districts having deficit or surplus bal-
ances. These balances flow into the Interdistrict Settlement Account
that is offset once a year in April (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2010).
3 See the time series for the Interdistrict Settlement Accounts under
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deterioration and regime shift would occur, with par-
ticular inflation dangers. 
This paper deals in depth with the credit replacement
hypothesis (Section 3) and the risk hypothesis
(Section 4), as these concern core aspects of central
banking (monetary policy implementation and the
lender of last resort function for solvent banks).
Section 2 explains the functioning and the economic
logic behind the T2 positions by means of a stylized
system of financial accounts (for an extensive and
more detailed presentation of the balance-sheet logic,
see Bindseil und König 2011). Finally, the ‘five min-
utes to midnight’ hypothesis is reviewed, also in the
light of more recent developments.
2. Target 2
2.1 Background and significance of T2
According to Article 105(2) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, it is the respon-
sibility of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) ‘to pro-
mote the smooth operation of payment systems’. A
smooth functioning of payment flows within the
Monetary Union is especially important as it (a) con-
tributes to the stability of the financial system, (b)
maintains confidence in the common currency and (c)
allows the implementation of a common monetary
policy (Bank for International Settlements 2003). 
To this end the Eurosystem runs the T2 payments sys-
tem.4 T2 permits the business partners of the
Eurosystem to conduct payments in unlimited volume
as well as to raise intraday credit against eligible col-
lateral. Furthermore, the central banks of the
Eurosystem settle their monetary policy operations
via T2. 
All payments via T2 are effected in central bank
money that the business partners must borrow direct-
ly from the central bank against central-bank eligible
collateral or in the interbank market. Accordingly,
payments and transactions within the currency area
are exclusively limited by the private stock of collater-
al eligible for obtaining central bank liquidity and not
as would be the case in a system of fixed exchange
rates, by the stock of foreign exchange of the respec-
tive central banks. In this way, T2 makes an essential
contribution to the maintenance of the currency
union. It provides the tool, as explained by Peter
Garber (2010), that irrevocably welds the former
national currencies into a common currency. 
2.2 The functioning of T2
In order to understand how the changes in T2 posi-
tions in the balance sheets of the national central
banks come about, it helps to look first at the pay-
ment transactions between two banks within one indi-
vidual country. Payments between banks are brought
about either by underlying real transactions or by a
mere reallocation of financial instruments. If, for
example, a buyer of a good transfers the purchase
amount to the seller, then his deposit at his bank is
reduced whereas that of the seller increases. If the
buyer’s bank executes the transfer via T2, the bank’s
reserve deposit at the central bank is reduced, where-
as the reserve deposit of the seller’s bank is increased.
A mere reallocation of financial instruments that also
involves a transfer between the accounts of two
banks, leads to the same accounting operations in the
reserve accounts of the banks at the central bank.
None of these transactions lead to a change in the
central bank balance sheet, as the banks have merely
exchanged reserve deposits among themselves with-
out however changing the total size of the reserve
account (a liability of the central bank). What hap-
pens now if a comparable transaction takes place
between banks from different countries in a common
currency area? The following system of financial
accounts illustrates this case. 
A number of assumptions are made for the sake of
simplicity. The system of financial accounts reflects
the case of a currency area without a minimum
reserve requirement so that we can assume that
reserve holdings of the banks at the central bank are
zero. Private households in the currency area own
equity of amount E that they hold in the form of real
assets, banknotes as well as sight deposits with the
commercial bank. We also assume that both countries
are identical so that banknotes and bank balance-
sheets are equally large. 
The example shows a reallocation of deposits of
amount z from banks in country 2 to banks in coun-
try 1. If, for example due to a financial crisis, the inter-
bank markets collapse or become segmented to such
an extent that the banks in country 2 no longer have
4 TARGET is the acronym for Trans-European Automated Real-
time Gross settlement Express Transfer (with Target2 being the sec-
ond version now in use for this payment system). All national central
banks are connected to Target2 (T2). Beyond that, all central banks
in the European Economic Area, which are not members of the euro
area, may also become part of T2.access, then the corresponding liquidity outflows can
only be compensated by taking recourse to the central
bank refinancing operations. This, however, does not
change the consolidated central bank balance-sheet of
the currency area, similarly to the above-mentioned
case of a purely national transaction (as long as
z < B/2, which is assumed here). 
Let us now split the central bank’s balance sheet in
two separate balance-sheets of the countries’ respec-
tive national central banks. We further assume that
the national central banks are responsible for their
respective banking systems, as is the case in the euro
area (European Central Bank 2011a, Ch. 2). In order
to balance the national central bank balance sheets,
an intra-central-bank position must be introduced for
accounting purposes. In our simple model, these posi-
tions are synonymous with the T2 positions in the bal-
ances of the national central banks of the Euro  -
system.
T2 balances are thus created by the settlement of
cross-border financial transactions between banks of
the euro area (see also European Central Bank
2011b). In the balance sheets of the national central
banks the T2 positions are consistently booked as
‘intra-Eurosystem liabilities’. At the end of each busi-
ness day these positions are aggregated (Eurosystem-
wide) and consolidated. Correspondingly, each
national central bank has either a claim (a positive T2
balance) or a liability (a negative T2 balance) vis-à-vis
the ECB as the central counterparty.
2.3 Increase in T2 positions and open market 
operations during the crisis 
During the present crisis, considerable changes have
occurred in the euro area in the T2 positions in the
balance sheets of the national central banks of differ-
ent countries. In particular, in the balance sheet of the
Deutsche Bundesbank a significant claim of several
hundreds of billion euros has built up, whereas the
central banks in countries threatened by a sovereign
debt crisis are showing considerable T2 liabilities. At
the same time, the share of the latter in the refinanc-
ing operations of the Eurosystem rose from an aver-
age 13.5 percent in the period before the crisis to
about 60 percent at the end of 2010. These develop-
ments form the core of the first part of the credit
replacement hypothesis mentioned in Section 1. Yet,
what triggered these developments?
At the start of the crisis there were disruptions, and
subsequently a complete drying up of the money sup-
ply and capital markets in the euro area. Increased
uncertainty regarding the future liquidity demand
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and an increased risk of default led to rising liquidity
and risk premia along the entire yield curve and to a
reduction of the transaction volumes in the interbank
market. Banks began to hoard liquidity instead of
offering their surpluses in the market (Holthausen
and Pill 2010). This exacerbated the smooth realloca-
tion of liquidity among the banks. As both the banks’
liquidity demand and the liquidity supply of the cen-
tral bank are relatively interest-inelastic, liquidity
hoarding leads, for a given liquidity supply, to sharp
fluctuations in short-term interest rates and thus to
strong fluctuations around the central bank’s main
refinancing rate (usually the mid-point of the interest
corridor).5 In such a situation, the central bank can
rely on special measures to counteract a systemic liq-
uidity crisis and a self-fulfilling confidence crisis in the
entire banking sector by decisively reducing the prob-
ability that individual banks become illiquid.6 In par-
ticular, the Eurosystem has temporarily allowed
unlimited access to central bank liquidity against eli-
gible collateral. This effectively led to a reduction of
uncertainty regarding the future demand for liquidity
and reduced interest premia in money markets. This
implies that from the point at which the liquidity defi-
ciency of the banking sector could no longer be real-
located via the market, the Eurosystem assumed the
role of the interbank market maker: when the banks
with liquidity surpluses deemed the difference
between market rates and the ECB’s deposit facility
rate no longer sufficient to offset the expected coun-
terparty default risk, they deposited their excess liq-
uidity with the deposit facility. By way of the deposit
facility, the Eurosystem thus automatically substitut-
ed for the loss of a sufficiently creditworthy demand
side.7 On the other hand, the Eurosystem substituted
for the supply side shortfall by
providing additional liquidity to
banks with a liquidity deficit
within the scope of its special measures and via the
main refinancing operations. In this way the
Eurosystem acted as an ‘interbank market maker’. 
When, in the course of the crisis, financial markets
became increasingly segmented along national bor-
ders, the intermediation activity of the central bank
began to exert an effect on the T2 positions in the
national central bank balance sheets. The banks in
countries threatened by sovereign debt crises started
to lose the confidence of investors and thus access to
private refinancing possibilities. This resulted in
strong net outflows of private capital and deposits.
Private depositors, lenders and capital providers start-
ed to withdraw funds from the banks in crisis-hit parts
of the currency area or decided not to renew loans in
order to invest the funds at banks in less affected parts
of the euro area. Investors prefer banks in those coun-
tries, whose banking systems are considered trustwor-
thy and whose fiscal situation seems to give their gov-
ernments sufficient leeway for possible interventions
and recapitalisations of the banking sector. Therefore,
during the crisis financial capital flowed in net in the
direction of banks in the safe havens of the European
currency area, thereby leading to the creation of con-
siderable T2 balances. Figure 1 shows that since 2008
there has been a massive increase in the T2 claims of
the Bundesbank, while in the most affected countries,
large T2 liabilities have emerged in the books. 
To prevent liquidity-caused bank breakdowns and
thereby ensure a proper transmission of the ECB
interest-rate decisions with a view to maintaining
price stability, the Eurosystem had to close the emerg-
















Central Bank of Ireland
Bank of Greece
T2 liabilities of selected national central banks in the euro area
Billion euros
Sources: National central banks.
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5 In this case, the control of the market
interest rate will become increasingly diffi-
cult. As the risk and liquidity premia
increase significantly along the yield curve,
the transmission of interest-rate decisions
of the central bank to the aggregate econ-
omy of the euro area will be limited by the
banking system as a whole, and will there-
by also threaten the maintenance of price
stability over the medium term. 
6 After the interbank market had dried up
in August 2007 and in the wake of the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008, the ECB took temporary non-stan-
dard measures (European Central Bank
2010). 
7 Alternatively, the central bank can also
actively absorb excessive liquidity, by auc-
tioning fixed-term deposits, for example,
or by issuing debt instruments. The corre-
sponding instruments of the ESCB are
described in European Central Bank
(2011, Ch. 2).countries. Figure 2 shows this very clearly. The share
of the BuBa (which was traditionally the largest) in
the refinancing operations of the Eurosystem has sig-
nificantly declined since the start of the sovereign debt
crisis. In the meantime, the shares of the national cen-
tral banks of Greece, Ireland and Portugal have
increased considerably. 
The balance sheets of the national central banks of
Greece, Ireland and Portugal show a higher supply of
liquidity on the asset side, whereas on the liability side
they display reduced reserve accounts of the commer-
cial banks as well as larger T2 liabilities vis-à-vis the
ECB. As the outflows from those countries induce
increases in the reserve accounts of the banks in the
recipient countries, they thus reduce the need for
those banks to participate in the refinancing opera-
tions of the Eurosystem. Minimum reserves and fac-
tors of liquidity needs can be met to a large extent out
of the inflows via the T2 system. The balance sheets of
the respective national central banks in the target
countries show a markedly reduced liquidity supply
on the asset side and a T2 claim vis-à-vis the ECB. 
3. Credit crowding-out hypothesis
Whereas the last Section 2.3 described the empirical
part of the credit replacement hypothesis, this section
will deal with the second part of this hypothesis. As
already mentioned in Section 1, the second part basi-
cally deals with a Gedankenexperiment (thought
experiment), since the question of whether lending to
private customers would have been larger or smaller if
there had not been any T2 balances cannot be
answered. In our opinion, Sinn
fails to provide a theoretical ex  -
planation in his papers as to why a
bank’s participation in the refi-
nancing operations of the central
bank constitutes the decisive de  -
terminant of lending to private
customers and why there is crowd-
ing out of credit when the partici-
pation in these operations is
reduced due to T2 inflows.8
As explained above, T2 balances
are created by cross-border pay-
ment flows between banks in the
euro area. These affect, of course,
the allocation of central bank liq-
uidity between individual national
central banks of the euro area. This does not imply,
however, that T2 liabilities, resulting from a relatively
large supply of liquidity to banks in some countries,
have a negative effect on lending to private house-
holds and businesses in other countries.9 Lending by
commercial banks to private customers is not limited
by central bank credit, but depends on internal risk
management, the creditworthiness of the customer,
the present state of the economy, etc. In addition,
commercial banks need a certain amount of liquidity
to accommodate autonomous factors of liquidity
needs, to settle financial transactions and to meet
their minimum reserves. If a commercial bank experi-
ences inflows through financial transactions, it will
need less central bank credit to maintain its business
activity and for its liquidity management, and there-
fore can reduce its participation in the open market
operations of the Eurosystem. It is not evident why
inflows via the T2 system will result in fewer loans to
commercial customers being made in the correspond-
ing recipient countries. On the contrary, banks in
countries with net capital inflows (i.e. in countries
whose central banks have T2 claims) will ceteris
paribus have a greater tendency to grant credit than
banks in countries suffering from net capital outflows.
Banks that receive inflows are in a much more com-
fortable financing situation since they receive
deposits, have wide access to capital markets and do
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8 See e.g. Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011). The assumption of a rela-
tionship between T2 balances and lending was also refuted by other
authors (see e.g. Buiter, Michels and Rahbari 2011; Whelan 2011).
9 It is a fact that before the financial crisis the BuBa had total intra-
Eurosystem liabilities of a two-digit billion figure. Besides the T2
balance, these resulted primarily from a higher-than-proportionate
(as compared with the BuBa’s share in the ECB’s capital) demand for
paper money by the business partners of the BuBa. At this time
nobody imagined that such intra-Eurosystem liabilities could have a
negative effect on lending in other countries (Jobst 2011).CESifo Forum 2012 89
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not need to pledge their collateral to obtain central-
bank liquidity. For such banks, the likelihood of
becoming illiquid is almost zero, so that in terms of
liquidity risk management, lending to the private sec-
tor can be expanded. The situation is completely dif-
ferent for banks in countries suffering from capital
and deposit outflows. Since banks in these countries
have impaired access to the capital market and since
central-bank refinancing is difficult to expand given a
limited pool of available eligible collateral, it becomes
difficult, from a liquidity and risk management per-
spective to extend credit to the private sector.
4. Risk hypothesis
4.1 Trade-off between liquidity provision and risk
assumption 
Liquidity provision during financial crises is always
risky. The BuBa already correctly pointed out that
T2 balances do not represent an independent source
of risk, but rather constitute an effect of risks creat-
ed for the Eurosystem by monetary policy opera-
tions and other, notably private, transactions
(Deutsche Bun  des  bank 2011). In this section we
shall therefore restrict the discussion to the general
role of the central bank in financial crises and the
associated risks. 
The trade-off between containing a systemic liquidity
crisis and an increased risk-exposure by the central
bank was already discussed by 19th century authors.
Jeremiah Harman (Governor of the Bank of England
1816–1818), so frequently quoted since Walter
Bagehot, argued that the extraordinary assistance
granted by the Bank of England during the financial
crisis of 1825 was always given under the accompany-
ing condition that the financial security of the central
bank was guaranteed: “we lent […] by every possible
means consistent with the safety of the Bank” (cited
in Bagehot 1999, 193).
Bagehot himself was of the opinion that an increased
provision of liquidity by central banks during a finan-
cial crisis would be necessary and useful to minimise
the financial risks of the central banks. Only in this
way could a financial meltdown and the accompany-
ing massive losses of the central bank be prevented.
To this extent, social motives and positive externalities
of central bank policy would not be necessary condi-
tions for an active provision of liquidity by central
banks during financial crises. 
Bagehot (1999, 199) went on to state: “making no
loans as we have seen will ruin it [Bank of England];
making large loans and stopping, as we have also
seen, will ruin it. The only safe plan for the Bank [of
England] is the brave plan, to lend in a panic on
every kind of current security, or every sort on which
money is ordinarily and usually lent. This policy may
not save the Bank; but if it does not, nothing will
save it”.
More recent presentations also argue that the assump-
tion of financial risks by state authorities in a finan-
cial crisis is unavoidable and useful. For example,
Buiter and Sibert (2007) write: “dealing with a liquid-
ity crisis and credit crunch is hard. Inevitably, it
exposes the central bank to significant financial and
reputational risk. The central banks will be asked to
take credit risk (of unknown) magnitude onto their
balance sheets and they will have to make explicit
judgments about the creditworthiness of various
counterparties. But without taking these risks the cen-
tral banks will be financially and reputationally safe,
but poor servants of the public interest”.
One must note here, however, that the principal will-
ingness to assume financial risks does not mean that
this should not be done with the greatest caution and
continuously optimised risk control measures. Here
we must contradict Buiter und Sibert (2007) decisive-
ly when they say that credit risks of ‘unknown magni-
tude’ ought to be taken. 
4.2 Conceptual relationship 
The trade-off discussed in the previous section can be
formalised in a simple partial model (for a more thor-
ough presentation, see Bindseil 2011). The ability to
refinance (funding liquidity) of the banking sector
may be represented by the following well defined func-
tion
L = L(M,X),
where LM > 0 and LX > 0. Let M be an index describ-
ing central bank policy and X a measure for the
exogenous factors that determine the individual and
systemic stability of the financial system. Assume that
the stability is the greater the bigger X and that X1 is
the value before the crisis and X2 the value that trig-
gers a crisis, i.e. X1 > X2.
Further, let R be a measure for the risks taken by the
central bank (e.g. the Value at Risk to a given confi-dence interval for a given time horizon). We assume
that R is a well-defined function of X and M,
R = R(M,X),
where RM > 0 and RX > 0. Let the objective function
of the central bank be given by 
U = U(R,L)
where we assume that UR < 0 and UL > 0.
Let us write the optimal central bank policy for a
given value of X as   M(X). The line EF1 in Figure 3
represents the efficient frontier for all combinations of
L and R for value X1 (before the crisis), where point A
denotes the optimum, i.e. the point 
for a given objective function of the central bank.
Consider an exogenous shock, so that X = X2, which
shifts the ‘efficient frontier’ to EF2. The important
question now regards the position of point 
, 
i.e. the point after eruption of the crisis, but before the
reaction of the central bank. Let us assume that the
efficient point, which the central bank wants to reach
in the crisis, corresponds to point B. 
The following four cases may now be distinguished,
depending on the measures that are required to reach
the efficient point B: 
￿ Point B: no need to adjust, i.e.
This case seems rather implausible. In fact, there
is hardly a central bank that, after the eruption of
a serious financial crisis, would not adjust its
financial market transactions and its risk man-
agement. 
￿ Point C: adjustment of measures to provide addi-
tional liquidity (increase of L) and simultaneously
assume greater risks (increase of R): 
and 
This is probably the case that e.g. Buiter und Sibert
(2007) consider normal. 
￿ Point D: adjustment of measures to provide more
liquidity, but assume fewer risks:
and
This case may also be plausible. Here the central
bank takes measures that improve the supply of
liquidity, and at the same time it succeeds in reduc-
ing the total risk by special protective measures.
￿ Point E: adjustment of measures so that less liq-
uidity is provided and fewer risks are taken: 
and 
This corresponds to the case of a conservative cen-
tral bank that lowers its risks at the expense of a
further deterioration of bank liquidity. 
It is not clear beyond doubt at which of the above
points the central bank is located after the outbreak
of a crisis and consequently which measures must be
taken in order to reach the efficient point. Therefore,
the answer to this question also depends on the
respective perception of the role of the central bank,
i.e. on the concrete form given to the objective func-
tion above. The T2 debate shows that in the euro 
area no consensus has been reached to date on this
question. 
Whether the financial risks taken by the governments
and the central bank in the present crisis are indeed
appropriate and optimally solve the trade-off between
the support of financial market stability and the
assumption of financial risks is therefore not easy to
assess. There is no basis, however, for claiming that
the ECB has acted without full awareness of the rele-
vant trade-offs, and especially in terms of responsible
and conservative risk management. 






    >
 
    >CESifo Forum 2012 91
Special Issue
5. Five minutes to midnight? 
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, 37–40) go so far as
to compare the shift in Eurosystem credit operations
from the euro area core countries to the periphery
countries with foreign exchange interventions that
central banks undertake to prevent their own curren-
cy from devaluing. Today’s ECB reminds them of the
Bank of England in 1992 when the latter failed to
defend the pound and as a consequence England left
the ERM. Sinn and Wollmershäuser claim that the
ECB’s “[…] stock of ammunition is also limited”
(p. 37). In their view, extrapolating the trend in
Eurosystem credit operations and Target2 balances
“[…] confirms the statement that if this trend contin-
ues, crowding out will lead to the end of the credit
replacement business of the ECB in about two years,
i.e. in 2013, as there will be no more central bank
credit in Germany or the other euro countries that
could be shifted to the GIPS [...] the ECB is under
enormous pressure to prevent this from happening”
as “the automatic sterilisation of the increase in the
money supply coming from the GIPS by reducing the
refinancing operations in the core countries would no
longer be possible” (p. 38). For Sinn and Wollmers  -
häuser, the core problem is then that “[t]he main refi-
nancing rate would just be a short-term rate for risky
banks with dubious collateral, and apart from that
there would be a well-functioning interbank market
between safe banks with a correspondingly lower
interest rate. This would be a disaster for the func-
tioning of the ECB and its ability to carry out the
policies to which it is legally obliged, in particular the
ability to keep inflation under control” (p. 39).
In our view, the comparison
between the ECB’s current euro
area – internal measures with the
Bank of England’s measures in
1992, or for that matter, any cen-
tral bank measure that aims at
defending a currency peg, is far-
fetched. The crucial point is that
maintenance of the common cur-
rency does not depend on the
central bank’s stock of foreign
exchange reserves. As some of us
have stated elsewhere (Bindseil
and König 2011), comparing
monetary policy in a currency
union with monetary policy
under a pegged ex  change rate
regime is not correct. 
For the sake of exposition, we can replicate Sinn and
Wollmershäuser’s scenario in the system of financial
accounts that was already used above. What they call
‘midnight’ is then tantamount to an increase of z
above B/2. In this case, the cash-rich Bank 1 will no
longer need to borrow from the central bank. Rather,
it will put its excess funds z-B/2 into the central bank’s
deposit facility. Indeed, the interest rate in the inter-
bank market that has previously taken place between
cash-rich banks (those in the country perceived as safe
haven) drops to the deposit facility rate (it should be
noted that in this case, market volumes will be rather
small because all banks in the safe haven country will
have excess funds and hence there will be in principle
no gains from trade). While one may lament the state
of the money market in this case, it is not correct to
claim that the central bank would no longer be able to
implement its desired monetary policy and to keep
inflation in check. For example, in order to tighten its
monetary policy stance, it just needs to raise the
deposit facility rate. Moreover, the central bank can
also rely on other tools in order to absorb liquidity
and to control the overnight rate: (i) issue debt certifi-
cates; (ii) collect term deposits, (iii) remunerate excess
reserves, or (iv) raise the minimum reserve require-
ments. All these tools are fairly standard today and
have long been part of central bank’s tool boxes all
over the world. Currently, almost all large central
banks (be it the Federal Reserve, the Bank of
England, the Bank of Japan, the Riksbank, the Swiss
National Bank, etc.) operate in such a scenario and
face a banking system with a considerable liquidity
surplus (often due to so-called ‘Large Scale Asset
Purchase Programmes’ or large foreign reserves).
   Figure 3 
   Liquidity provision and risk assumptions 
































Source: Author’s conception.None of these central banks has had any problems in
controlling inflation (i.e. no problems relating to this
particular way of implementing monetary policy). 
While Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) forecasted
‘midnight’ (i.e. our ‘z = B/2’) to arise in 2013, Sinn
noted later10 that “[…] in September 2011, the Bun  -
desbank’s stock of refinancing loans, net of its deposit
facilities vis-à-vis German banks, turned negative for
the first time in history. The ECB’s shifting of refi-
nancing credit via the Target system has therefore
already hit the limit, three years earlier than the trend
of the past three years would have suggested”. Sinn
argues further that “with this, the eurozone has
entered dangerous territory. Deposit facilities count
as central bank money and have inflationary poten-
tial, given that the German banks could withdraw
those funds at any time. If they do, more than the
Target balances could be exploding in Europe”. It is
not clear to us, how German banks can actually with-
draw these funds at any time, and why they should do
so. The overall level of excess funds deposited with the
Bundesbank is not under the control of German
banks. It is a mere result of the intra-euro area cross
border capital flight and of the other positions in the
Bundesbank balance sheet. The only possibilities to
reduce these excess funds would be either to withdraw
them in the form of banknotes and then to keep these
banknotes in vaults, or to ship them back to the crisis-
hit countries by lending to their banks, respectively by
purchasing assets there. From an economic point of
view, the former does not make sense. The latter
should be seen as a positive development as it would
revert the excess liquidity flows and would contribute
to boosting confidence in the euro area’s crisis-hit
countries.
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